BARBAROSSA-HITLER'S PLAN TO INVADE RUSSIA
While Hitler was busy that summer of 1940 directing the conquest of the West, Stalin was taking advantage of the Führer's preoccupation by moving into the Baltic States and reaching down into the Balkans. On the surface all was friendly between the two great dictatorships. Molotov, acting for Stalin, lost no opportunity to praise and flatter the Germans on every occasion of a new act of aggression or a fresh conquest. When Germany invaded Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940, the Soviet Foreign Commissar hastened to tell Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow that very morning that 'the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced on Germany'. 'We wish Germany', said Molotov, 'complete success in her defensive measures'.
A month later, when the German Ambassador called on Molotov to inform him officially of the Wehrmacht's attack in the West, which Ribbentrop had instructed his envoy to explain 'was forced upon Germany by the impending Anglo-French push on the Ruhr by way of Belgium and Holland', the Soviet Statesman again expressed his pleasure. 'Molotov received the communication in an understanding spirit', Schulenburg wired Berlin, 'and added that he realised that Germany must protect herself against Anglo-French attack. He had no doubt of our success'.
On June 17, the day France asked for an armistice, Molotov summoned Schulenburg to his office 'and expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of the German Wehrmacht'. Although he had other matters on his mind.
|Hitler with members of his General staff|
The Foreign Commissar had something else to say, and this did not sound so quite pleasant to German ears. He informed the German envoy, as the latter wired Berlin 'most urgent', of 'the Soviet action against the Baltic States', adding 'that it had become necessary to put an end to all the intrigues by which England and France had tried to sow discord and mistrust between Germany and the Soviet Union in the Baltic States. To put an end to such 'discord' the Soviet Government, Molotov added, had dispatched 'special emissaries' to the three Baltic countries. They were in fact three of Stalin's best hatchet-men: Dekanozov, who was sent to Lithuania, Vishinsky, to Latvia, Zhadanov, to Estonia.
They carried out their assignment with the thoroughness which one would expect from this trio, especially the latter two individuals. Already on June 14, the day German troops entered Paris, the Soviet Government had sent a nine-hour ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the resignation of its government, the arrest of some of its key officials and the right to send in as many Red Army troops as it pleased. Though the Lithuanian government accepted the ultimatum, Moscow deemed its acceptance 'unsatisfactory', and the next day, June 15, Soviet troops occupied the country, the only one of the Baltic States to border Germany. During the next couple of days similar Soviet ultimatums were dispatched to Latvia and Estonia, after which they were similarly overrun by the Red Army.
|Soviet tanks enter Riga on 17, July 1940|
Adolf Hitler was humiliated, but, busy as he was trying to organise the invasion of Britain, could do nothing about it. The letters from the envoys of the three Baltic States in Berlin protesting Russian aggression were returned to them by order of Ribbentrop. To further humble the Germans, Molotov brusquely told them on August 11 to 'liquidate' their legations in Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn within a fortnight and close down their Baltic consulates by September 1.
The seizure of the Baltic States did not satisfy Stalin's appetite. The surprising quick collapse of the Anglo-French armies spurred him on to get as much as he could while the getting was good. He obviously thought there was little time to lose. On June 23, the day after the French formally capitulated and signed the armistice at Compegne, Molotov again called in the Nazi Ambassador in Moscow and told him that 'the solution of the Bessarabian brooked no further delay. The Soviet Government was determined to use force, should the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement'. It expected Germany, Molotov added, 'not to hinder but support the Soviets in their action'. Moreover, 'the Soviet claim likewise to Bucovina'. Bessarabia had been taken by Romania from Russia at the end of the First World War, but Bucovina had never belonged to it, having been under Austria until Romania grabbed it in 1919. At the negotiations in Moscow for the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Ribbentrop, as now reminded Hitler, who had questioned him about it, had been forced to give Bessarabia to the Russian sphere of interest. But he had never given away Bucovina.
|Soviet T-26 tank leading a column of BA-10 armoured cars into Romania, circa late Jun 1940|
On the night of June 26, Russia delivered an ultimatum to Rumania demanding the ceding to it to Bessarabia and the northern Bucovina and insisting on a reply the next day. Ribbentro, in panic, dashed off instructions from his special train to his minister in Bucharest telling him to advise the Rumanian government to yield, which it did on June 27. Soviet troops marched into the newly acquired territories the next day and Berlin breathed a sigh of relief that at least the rich sources of oil and food had not been cut off by Russia's grabbing the whole of Rumania. It is clear from his acts and from secret German papers that though Stalin was out to get all he could in Eastern Europe while the Germans were tied down in the West, he did not wish or contemplate a break with Hitler.
|Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina|
Towards the end of June Churchill had tried to warn Stalin in a personal letter of the danger of the German conquests to Russia as well as to Britain. The Soviet dictator did not bother to answer, probably, like almost everyone else, he thought Britain was finished. So he tattled to the Germans what the British government was up to. Sir Stafford Cripps, a left-wing Labour Party leader, whom the Prime Minister had rushed to Moscow as the new ambassador in the hope of striking a more responsive chord among the Bolsheviks, a forlorn hope, as he later ruefully admitted, was received by Stalin early in July in an interview that Churchill described as 'formal and frigid'. On July 13 Molotov, on Stalin's instructions, handed the German ambassador a written memorandum of this confidential conversation. It is an interesting document. It reveals, as no other source does, the servere limitations of the Soviet dictator in his cold calculations of foreign affairs. Schulenburg sped it to Berlin 'most urgent' and, of course, 'secret', and Ribbentrop was so grateful for its contents that he told the Soviet government he 'greatly appreciated this information'. Cripps had pressed Stalin, the memorandum said, for his attitude on this principal question, among others:
The British Government was convinced that Germany was striving for hegemony in Europe...This was dangerous to the Soviet Union as well as England. Therefore both countries ought to agree on a common policy of self-protection against Germany and on a re-establishment of the European balance of power...Stalin's answers are given as follows: He did not see any danger of hegemony of any one country in Europe and still less any danger that Europe be engulfed by Germany. Stalin observed the policy of Germany, and knew several leading German statesmen well. He had not discovered any desire on their part to engulf European countries. Stalin was not of the opinion that Germany military success menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations with Germany... Such staggering smugness, such abysmal ignorance leave one breathless. The Russian tyrant did not know, of course, the secrets of Hitler's turgid mind, but the Führer's past behaviour, his known ambitions and the unexpectedly rapid German conquests ought to have been enough to warn him of the dire danger the Soviet Union was now in. But, incomprehensibly, they were not enough.
From the captured German documents and from testimony of many leading German figures in the great drama that was being played over the vast expanse of Western Europe that year, it is plain that at the very moment of Stalin's monumental complacency Hitler had in fact been mulling over in his mind the idea of turning on the Soviet Union and destroying her. The basic idea went back much further, at least fifteen years, to "Mein Kampf"...'this colossal empire in the East is ripe for dissolution, and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state'...This basic idea lay like bedrock in Hitler's mind, and this pact with Stalin had not changed it at all, but merely postponed acting on it, and but briefly. In fact, less than two months later the deal was signed and had been utilized to destroy Poland the Führer instructed the Army that the conquered Polish territory was regarded 'as an assembly area for further future German operations'. The date was October 18, 1939, and Halder recorded it that day in his diary.
|Hitler (hand on side) and German Military officers staring at, WWI French marshall, Maréchal Foch's memorial statue before entering the railway carriage where will be signed the 1940 armistice, at Compiègne, France.|
Five weeks later, on November 23, when he harangued his reluctant generals about attacking in the West, Russia was by no means out of his mind, 'We can oppose Russia', he declared, 'Only when we are free in the West'. At that time the two-front war, the nightmare of German generals for a century, was very much on Hitler's mind, and he spoke of it at length on this occasion. He would not repeat the mistake of former German rulers, he would continue to see to it that the Army had one front at a time. It was only natural then, that with the fall of France, the chasing of the British Army across the Channel and the prospects of Britain's imminent collapse, Hitler's thoughts should turn once again to Russia. For he now supposed himself to be free in the West and thereby to have achieved the one condition he had laid down in order to be in the position to 'oppose Russia'. The rapidity with which Stalin seized the Baltic States and the two Rumanian provinces in June spurred Hitler to a decision.
The moment of its making can now be traced. Jodl said that the 'fundamental decision' was 'as far back as during the Western Campaign'. Colonel Walter Warlimont, Jodl's deputy at OKW, remembers that on July 29 Jodl announced at a meeting of Operation Staff officers that 'Hitler intended to attack the U.S.S.R. in the spring of 1941'. Sometime previous to this meeting, Jodl related, Hitler had told Keitel 'that he intended to launch the attack against the U.S.S.R. during the fall of 1940'. But this was too much even for Keitel and he had argued Hitler out of it by contending that not only the bad weather in the autumn but the difficulties of transferring the bulk of the Army from West to the East made it impossible. By the time of this conference on July 29,Warlimont related, 'the date for the intended attack (against Russia) had been moved back to the spring of 1941'.
Only a week before, we know from Halder's diary, the Führer had still held to a possible campaign in Russia for the autumn if Britain were not invaded. At a military conference in Berlin on July 21 he told Brauchitsch to get busy on the preparation for it. That the Army Commander in Chief and his General Staff already had given the problem some thought, but not enough thought, is evident from his response to Hitler. Brauchitsch told the Leader that the campaign 'would last four to six weeks' and that the aim would be to defeat the Russian Army or at least to occupy enough Russian territory so that Soviet bombers could not reach Berlin or the Silesian industrial area while, on the other hand, the Luftwaffe bombers could reach all important objectives in the Soviet Union'. Brauchitsch thought that from eighty to a hundred German divisions could do the job, he assessed Russian strength as 'fifty to seventy-five good divisions'. Halder's notes on what Brauchitsch told him of the meeting show that Hitler had been stung by Stalin's grabs in the East, that he thought the Soviet dictator was 'coquetting with England' in order to encourage her to hold out, but that he had no signs that Russia was preparing to enter the war against Germany.
|A German and a Soviet officer shaking hands at the end of the Invasion of Poland.'|
|The Berghof" on the Obersalzberg, the house of Adolf Hitler. In the foreground, the main entrance|
|The "Great Hall"|
The next day, August 1, Halder went to work on the plans with his General Staff. Though he would later claim to have opposed the whole idea of an attack on Russia as insane, his diary entry for this day discloses him full of enthusiasm as he applied himself to the challenging new task. Planning now went ahead with typical German thoroughness on three levels: that of the Army General Staff, of Warlimont's Operation Staff at OKW, and of General Thomas' Economic and Armaments Branch OKW. Thomas was instructed on August 14 by Göring that Hitler desired deliveries of ordered goods to the Russians "only till spring of 1941". In the meantime his office was to make a detailed survey of Soviet industry, transportation and oil centres both as a guide to targets and later on as an aid for administrating Russia. [In his report on this, Thomas stresses how punctual Soviet deliveries of goods to Germany were at this time. In fact, he says, they continued to be 'right up to the start of the attack', and observes, not without amusement, that 'even during the last days, shipments of India rubber from the Far East were completed by the Russians over express transit trains', presumable the Trans-Siberian Railway,sic]
A few days before, on August 9, Warlimont had got out his first directive for preparing the deployment areas in the East for the jump-off against the Russians. The code name for this was 'Aufbau Ost' (Build-up East). On August 26, Hitler ordered ten infantry and two armoured divisions to be sent from the West to Poland. The Panzer Units, he stipulated, were to be concentrated in south-eastern Poland so that they could intervene to protect the Rumanian oil fields. The transfer of large bodies of troops to the East could not be done without exiting Stalin's easily aroused suspicions if he learned of it, and the Germans went to great lengths to see that he didn't.[The Germans had kept only seven divisions in Poland, two of which were transferred to the West during the spring campaign. The troops there, Halder cracked, were scarcely enough to maintain the customs service. If Stalin had attacked Germany in June 1940, the Red Army probably could have got to Berlin before any resistance was organized, sic]
Since some movements were bound to be detected, General von Köstring, the German military attaché in Moscow, was instructed to inform the Soviet General Staff that it was merely of replacing older men, who were being released to industry, by younger men. On September 6, Jodl got out a directive outlining in considerable detail the means of camoflage and deception. 'These regroupings', he laid down, 'must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East'. So that the armed services should not rest on their laurels after the great victories of the summer, Hitler issued on November 12, 1940, a comprehensive top-secret directive outlining new military tasks all over Europe and beyond in particular in dealing with the Soviet Union. It reads in part: 'Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued. Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army's operational plans have been submitted to, and approved by, me'.
As a matter of fact, on that very day, November 12, Molotov arrived in Berlin to continue with Hitler himself those political discussions.
continued under Part 2
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